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Abstract— The aim of the Nu.Sa. project is the definition of 
national level data standards to collect data coming from General 
Practitioners’ Electronic Health Records and to allow secure 
data sharing between them. This paper introduces the Nu.Sa. 
framework and is mainly focused on security issues. A solution 
for secure data sharing and service interoperability is presented 
and implemented in the actual system used around Italy. The 
solution is strongly focused on privacy and correct data sharing 
with a complete set of tools devoted to authorization, encryption 
and decryption in a data sharing environment and a distributed 
architecture. The implemented system with more than one year 
of experiences in thousands of test cases shows a good feasibility 
of the approach and a future scalability in a cloud based 
architecture. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The need to create a set of computer science tools intended 
to the general medicine and governed by the same profession 
stems from several considerations. The first is undoubtedly the 
need to implement Functional Territorial Associations (FTA, 
AFT in the Italian acronym) of next constitution, and in 
general, any existing association with a tool that overcomes the 
difficulties to use different ambulatory software tools that do 
not allow a network connection among their databases, because 
they come from different manufacturers. In this case, in order 
to allow the so-called "mixed network", different databases 
have to be converted to a common standard so that everyone 
can easily interpret data. Starting from this assumption, the 
Netmedica Italy (NMI) company was established, with the 
objective to realize a digitalization and cloud computing 
project concerning general medicine [1], to facilitate the 
sharing of health data and coordinate their streams. In the work 
[2], the authors present a survey of new scenarios in healthcare 
through the emerging cloud computing technology, where 
many papers highlight the importance for practitioners to share 
healthcare data in a common system [3], [4], [5]. The authors 
of [6] propose a cloud computing system for sharing medical 
image of a hospital. The sharing of data led to the possibility of 
bringing to the professional sensitivity many dynamics and 
operations imposed by informative systems so far managed and 
governed by others, by undertaking a path of awareness and 
responsibility that the general medicine (GM), in step with the 
evolution of Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT), must certainly live as a protagonist. The term eHealth, 
introduced for the first time by Mitchell [7], is defined as the 
use of ICT across the whole range of healthcare functions and 
can contribute to cope with the challenges currently faced by 
healthcare systems in Europe. These challenges include the 
need to ensure system sustainability while preserving quality in 
the face of an ageing population. The adoption of eHealth, 
matched by organisational changes and by other technical 
innovations, can turn these challenges into the triple wins set as 
targets of the European Innovation Partnership on Active and 
Healthy Ageing (EIP AHA): quality of life, sustainability, 
innovation and growth. There are many recent works that put 
in evidence the importance of confidentiality for eHealth data 
systems, concentrating on the security framework [8], [9], [10]  
and in [11] the reasons for maintaining medical data private 
and restricting the access are explained. According to [12], 
security and privacy for data sharing can be ensured if 
technology, legal and social aspects are considered during the 
realization of eHealth systems. They retain that departing from 
a sociotechnical analysis, security and privacy in eHealth are 
possible. 
In the general Italian medicine scenario, the adoption of 
eHealth in primary care by General Practitioners (GPs) is 
pivotal to realise the above mentioned potential.  
We believe that the development of a common platform 
devoted to GPs allows to "create a system" which, besides to 
give an image of compactness (and also promote the instances 
of representativeness and "contractual strength"), provides a 
basis for the endless opportunities of interoperability with all 
other available databases. In this context, each practitioner 
might already be ready to share subsets of health and care data 
of his patients with other practitioners. It is possible to imagine 
a system in which the same GP accredits the patient to access a 
protected part of his clinical record, where activities of 
informative collaboration, authorization or denial for sharing of 
health information, acquisition by the patient of clinical data to 
make them available to other doctors for consultation are 
allowed. It is also appropriate and technically possible, having 
to manage a single database in the cloud, to encourage the 
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doctor in the process of auditing and reporting, equipping him 
with the evolved tools for database querying; as it is possible to 
support the doctor with professional services aimed at 
improving and facilitating his activities. Federsanità Anci, with 
its eHealth sector, fully supports goals and intentions proposed 
by NMI and, supposing to create a deeper integration with 
other databases of healthcare systems, it has strongly shared 
the initiative, by participating in the establishment of the 
Foundation NU.SA. - Cloud Health. Nu.Sa. (Nuvola Sanitaria) 
is an Italian project going in that direction and born in Italy in 
2012. 
II. THE NU.SA. PROJECT 
The aim of the Nu.Sa. project is the definition of national 
level data standards to collect data coming from GP’s 
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) on a cloud based 
architecture. Today, the project involves thousands of Italian 
GPs collecting data from millions of patients. Two key features 
of the Nu.Sa. system are: the referral of patients and portability 
of data. In most clinical environments around the world and 
also in Italy, the healthcare of the individual patient is shared 
between Specialists and GPs. Often there is a gap in the 
exchange of important information between the two groups and 
Nu.Sa. can provide a solution at a national and European level 
to cope with this limitation. 
Data are collected and shared using an open standard [13] 
and the system architecture is mainly focused on data sharing 
and interoperability with an intensive effort on privacy and 
data security. This paper is mainly based on the description of 
the security concerns relevant to these systems and services, 
and on the technical solutions, which are most suitable to 
overcome them. 
In fact, while there are some international standards, which 
regulate the main requisites of eHealth data systems in relation 
to consumers, like the ASTM E2211 standard[14], security and 
privacy issues are regulated at a national level, and therefore 
must be addressed by taking into account the national 
regulations. 
By focusing on the case of Italian GPs, the most important 
security requisites are: i) to guarantee that data are properly 
collected and handled, ii) to guarantee that data are safely 
stored and storage is limited within the Italian territory, iii) to 
guarantee that data are accessed only by authorized doctors and 
that iii) data integrity and consistency is ensured.. 
A. Electronic health record 
The EHR (denoted by the Italian acronym FSE, or 
Fascicolo Sanitario Elettronico) is a collection of electronic 
documents available to doctors, pharmacists and hospitals, 
which collect the health data of a patient, such as diseases, 
surgical procedures, medical tests, prescribed medications and 
hospitalizations. In 2008, with a view to modernizing the 
health care system, both public and private, it has been 
established with the aim of creating a relationship between 
health care professionals and organizations involved in the life 
of the individual through clinical documents which are 
continuously updated using a computer system. The purposed 
of the FSE are prevention, diagnosis, treatment and 
rehabilitation of the patient who can freely choose whether or 
not to converge clinical information concerning him in this 
electronic file, ensuring also the possibility that his health 
information will remain available only to authorized 
professionals or sanitary organisms. In case the patient does 
not give the consensus, since it is completely optional, it 
cannot proceed with the treatment, but it has not any effect on 
other consensus to other treatments provided in health care. 
The D.L. n. 69 of 2013, so-called Decree of the Making (or 
Decreto del fare, in Italian), specified the role of the Agency 
for digital Italy, which hosts  project plans presented by the 
Regions and Autonomous Provinces for the implementation of 
the FSE and establishing the criteria for the creation no later 
than 30 June 2014.  
In the context of cooperation among health care facilities is 
expected that every structure creates its Electronic Health 
Dossier (Dossier Sanitario Elettronico, DSE, in Italian), all the 
DSE will form the FSE. 
B. Functional territorial associations 
In recent years, the primary health care of the citizens has 
faced radical changes in order to improve the efficiency and 
capability of providing public medical assistance to patients. 
The law n. 189/2012 (Balduzzi) with the national collective 
agreement (ACN) provides a reorganization of primary care in 
mono-professional organizational forms called functional 
territorial associations (FTA, Art. 1), complemented by the 
Complex Primary Care Units (UCCP). On this side, ICT is 
considered a fundamental tool for functional aggregation and 
integration of local and hospital care. In this context, the 
production of a report to support the planning and control of 
FTA activities plays an important role. 
However, in the text of the law 189/2012, the modality of 
healthcare data treatment in a computerized way is not cited, 
neither their safety nor their access, demanding these issues to 
the guidelines introduced in the D. L. 196/2003 regarding 
personal data security. 
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ASSURING TECHNIQUES 
The use of robust and up-to-date information security and 
privacy techniques is a fundamental pillar of the Nu.Sa. 
project. There are two main requirements to fulfill: 
1. Avoid unauthorized access to the healthcare data of any 
patient (security requirement or confidentiality 
requirement). 
2. Avoid that authorized users other than the medical 
doctor who is in charge of a patient are able to match 
the name of that patient with his healthcare data 
(privacy requirement). 
These two requirements must be fulfilled by exploiting suitable 
design solutions for the hardware/software architecture and the 
encryption of healthcare data. They represent two challenges 
which must be faced together, since the design choices affect 
the choice of the encryption techniques and vice-versa. 
Concerning the privacy requirement, an intriguing solution 
is represented by the use of the so-called negative databases 
[15], in which the information is complemented before being 
stored. In other terms, all the strings which do not describe the 
identity of a user are stored in the database, such that a search 
query on that user is successful only if it returns no matches. 
Despite this is an ingenious way of protecting the users’ 
privacy, it has several drawbacks, since it considerably 
increases the storage space and the management complexity. 
Therefore, we consider a different approach which simplifies 
the practical implementation of the system. 
Another solution to provide for users’ data privacy in 
databases is represented by the concept of k-anonymity and its 
variants [16], [17], [18]. The rationale of this approach is to 
analyze the sets of attributes of each user and to store in each 
database only a subset of them which are common to a 
sufficiently large set of users, in such a way as to introduce 
some ambiguity if one tries to identify the user from such a set 
of attributes. This approach has the advantage of not requiring 
the use of cryptographic functions to protect privacy. However, 
it requires to perform a thorough analysis of the common 
attributes among users both the first time the database is 
populated and each time it is updated. 
In the considered scenario, we need to use cryptographic 
functions to provide for data confidentiality, and we can also 
exploit some peculiar features of the existing 
hardware/software architecture. This allows us to achieve the 
desired levels of security and privacy without the need to resort 
to negative or k-anonymous databases. 
The block scheme of the architecture we use to achieve the 
desired level of security and privacy of the users’ data is 
reported in Fig. 1. The main components of the system are: 
• In the EHRs, each patient is identified through a unique, 
randomly generated Patient Identifier (PID). Then, for 
each patient the EHRs contain the records and files 
collecting his diseases, clinical exam reports, 
treatments, previous surgeries, etc. 
• The Patient Registry (PR), which contains a personal 
data record for each patient registered to the service. 
This personal data record includes the identifiers of the 
Medical Doctors (MDs) who are in charge of a patient 
and, for each MD, an Enciphered Patient Identifier 
(EPID). 
• The Aggregation and Login Server (ALS), which 
provides a frontend for the MD terminals and for the 
extraction, manipulation and presentation of the users’ 
data. 
• The MD terminals: each MD is expected to have a 
master terminal (e.g., a workstation at his office) and a 
set of slave terminals (e.g., his mobile phones, tablets, 
notebooks, etc.). 
• The patient terminal: the system can allow patients to 
access the system. 
This architecture is able to achieve the security and privacy 
targets by exploiting a basic fact which characterizes the 
current scenario: each MD has a master terminal in which the 
healthcare data of the patients he is in care of are stored and 
associated to the patients themselves. This situation stems from 
legacy software tools which are installed at the MDs’ offices, 
and contain a local copy of the medical records concerning 
their patients. The MDs are allowed to associate the identity of 
each patient with his medical record, and the security of these 
data is protected through classical methods (like operating 
system passwords and local database encryption).  
Based on such a scenario, the following procedures are 
used to populate, update and query the online system depicted 
in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Security and privacy assuring architecture. 
A. Database population 
When a MD subscribes to the service, he has the ability to 
populate the online registries with the personal and healthcare 
data of the patients he is in care of. For this purpose: 
1. The MD authenticates into the system through the ALS 
by using his master terminal. 
2. The local software client generates a unique PID for 
each patient having a record in the local database, and 
stores the PIDs in the local database too. 
3. The local software client uses a symmetric encryption 
algorithm (E) and a private key owned by the MD (K) 
to obtain an Encrypted PID (EPIDK) for each PID, i.e., 
EPIDK = EK(PID). Details on the encryption algorithm 
will be provided in the next section. 
4. The ALS receives a record containing the personal data 
of the patient, the name of the MD and the EPIDK, and 
creates a new entry in the PR to store these data. 
5. The ALS receives a record containing the PID of the 
patient and his medical data, and creates a new entry in 
one or more EHRs to store these data. 
6. Some EHRs may be already populated with the patient 
data (e.g., when they are hosted by the healthcare center 
where the data was created). In this case, the web 
services exposed by the HR are used to query it based 
on its own indexing, and the PID is added to the 
matching records and data. 
B. Patient query 
When a MD wishes to perform a query concerning one of 
his patients, he works from any of his terminals (master or 
slaves), and: 
Name Surn. … MDs EPIDs
… … … … …
… … … … …
… … … … …
Patient Registry
PID Diseases Treatm. Surgery …
… … … … …
… … … … …
… … … … …
Electronic Healthcare Records
Aggregation/Login
ServerMD master
MD slave 2
MD slave 1
SSL
SSL
SSL
PID Diseases Treatm. Surgery …
… … … … …
… … … … …
… … … … …
PID Diseases Treatm. Surgery …
… … … … …
… … … … …
… … … … …
Patient terminal
1. He authenticates from the local software client into the 
online system through the ALS. 
2. He performs a query to the ALS based on the name (or 
other personal data) of the patient. 
3. The ALS queries the PR, checks that the patient is 
associated to the MD and return the corresponding 
EPIDK. 
4. The local software client uses a symmetric decryption 
algorithm (D) and the private key owned by the MD (K) 
to obtain the PID from the EPIDK, i.e., PID = 
DK(EPIDK), and queries the ALS with such a PID. 
5. The ALS queries the EHRs with the PID and presents 
the medical data of the patient to the MD terminal. 
C. MD roistering 
An important feature of this system is to support roistering 
of the MDs. This is necessary, for example, in functional 
territorial associations of MDs, where more than one MD 
assists a patient, or when a MD is out of work and must be 
temporarily substituted by another MD. In order to cope with 
these cases, the system exploits a feature, which already exists 
in the Italian healthcare system: each patient is associated to a 
Primary MD (PMD), who is administratively responsible for 
the healthcare of that patient. Then, one or more Secondary 
MDs (SMDs) may temporarily or permanently substitute the 
PMD. The system exploits this fact and relies on the PMD for 
enabling the patient data access by SMDs. In order to enable a 
SMD: 
1. The PMD authenticates into the system through the 
ALS from one of his terminals (master or slaves). 
2. The PMD performs a query to the PR, through the ALS, 
based on the personal data of the patients for whom he 
wishes to enable the SMD. 
3. The ALS retrieves the list of the EPIDs obtained from 
the PR for those patients, and sends them (or puts them 
in a sending queue) to the SMD local client. 
4. The first time the designated SMD authenticates into the 
system, he is asked to accept the designation sent by the 
PMD. After accepting, the SMD receives the list of 
EPIDs and encrypts again each of them by using his 
private key (SK), i.e., EEPIDK,SK = ESK(EPIDK). Then he 
sends them back to the ALS. 
5. The ALS receives the doubly encrypted PIDs and sends 
them (or puts them in a sending queue) to the PMD. 
6. The next time the PMD authenticates into the system, 
he receives the notification that the SMD has accepted 
his designation, together with the list of the doubly 
encrypted PIDs. He then decrypts each of them with his 
private key (K): EPIDSK = DK(EEPIDK,SK), thus 
obtaining a list of PIDs encrypted through the SMD 
private key. The cryptographic functions to be used for 
this purpose are described in the next section. 
7. For each patient in the list, the PMD sends the 
corresponding EPIDSK to the ALS, which adds it to the 
corresponding record in the PR, together with the name 
of the designated SMD. 
This way, after authenticating into the system through the 
ALS, the SMD can perform a query concerning the patients for 
whom he has been delegated, by following the same procedure 
described in Section IV.B. The SMD does not need any master 
client, since he is not administratively responsible for the 
medical records of such patients. 
Concerning the revocation of the PMD designations, it can 
be easily implemented by including in the PR a field, which 
contains the time intervals in which each a pair (SMD, EPID) 
is valid. This way, each SMD can be delegated for a limited 
period, or only at some specific times during each day, week or 
month. Then, some background task has to be periodically run 
to clear the expired entries from the PR. Obviously, the PMD 
can also manually ask the system to remove the pairs (SMD, 
EPID) which he wants to revoke. 
D. Medical records updating/replacement/removal 
A necessary task is to periodically update, replace or 
remove some patients’ medical records. This can be easily 
done through the architecture described in Fig. 1. In fact, both 
the PMD and the SMDs are allowed to write in some of all 
EHRs, through the ALS. This way, they can update or replace 
the patients’ medical records, if they wish. All the terminals 
will then see the updated medical records each time they query 
the updated EHRs. A background task must be periodically 
performed to synchronize the local database in the PMD master 
terminal with the contents of the updatable EHRs. 
A different situation concerns the insertion of new patients 
and the removal of registered patients. These tasks are only 
allowed by the PMD who is responsible for those patients. If 
he wishes to add a new patient to the system, he simply has to 
follow the procedure described in Section III.A. Then, he will 
be automatically associated to the new patient as his PMD. If 
instead the PMD wishes to remove a patient, he can execute 
such a task through the ALS. This is performed in two stages: 
i) the PMD sends the PID to the ALS, and the ALS removes 
the corresponding record from the editable EHRs, ii) the PMD 
sends the EPID to the ALS, and the ALS removes the 
corresponding entry from the PR, including the EPIDs of the 
possible SMDs of that patient. The operations of insertion and 
removal of patients should be performed from the PMD master 
terminal, in such a way as to keep the local database updated. 
Alternatively, these procedures can also be enabled from the 
PMD slave terminals. However, in such a case, the slave 
terminals must store local databases as well, and a parallel 
system must be deployed to periodically flush them to the local 
database in the PMD master terminal. 
A particular situation arises if the PMD loses his private 
key. In such a case, he is no longer able to decrypt the EPIDs 
he computed, and therefore the system is unable to retrieve 
from the EHRs the medical records of his patients. This is a 
drawback of this solution with respect to more involved 
approaches, like negative databases and k-anonymity. 
However, we can overcome this problem by exploiting the fact 
that the PMD has a master terminal, which contains the 
medical records of his patients and their PIDs. Therefore, if the 
PMD loses his private key, he can generate another one, and 
regenerate the corresponding EPIDs from his master terminal. 
Then, the new EPIDs must be sent to the ALS, which replaces 
them into the PR. If instead a SMD loses his secret key, he 
must notify the system, which then requests the PMD to 
delegate the SMD again, by following the procedure described 
in Section IV.C. This allows the SMD to re-compute his 
associated EPIDs with his newly generated private key, and the 
ALS then replaces them into the PR. 
E. Data obfuscation 
In some cases, although the patient identity is unassociated 
to his medical data contained in the EHRs, it may be requested 
to obfuscate the latter. For example, this may occur for some 
text fields where the MD can insert free notes, which may 
inadvertently identify the patient. For this reason, the system 
must provide the chance to obfuscate some of the data 
contained in the EHRs.  
This is achieved by using the same symmetric encryption 
algorithm (E) used for computing the EPID starting from the 
PID, whose details are provided in the next section. However, 
in this case, the secret key used for encrypting the data to 
obfuscate is not the MD secret key (K), but is computed 
starting from a combination of the patient’s personal data 
contained in the PR. This way, any MD (the PMD or the 
delegated SMDs) who is able to match the PID with the patient 
identity contained in the PR is also able to compute the secret 
key needed to decrypt the obfuscated data. Concatenating some 
of the personal data of the patient, extracted from the PR, and 
then computing a hash digest of the resulting string obtain the 
secret key. 
Using the secret key so computed has the advantage of 
avoiding the replication of the obfuscated data which would be 
necessary by using the PMD and SMDs secret keys. On the 
other hand, a drawback of this approach is that, since the 
algorithm used for computing the secret key is known, a 
malicious user having access to the PR and EHRs could 
compute all the secret keys corresponding to all the patients 
and try to decrypt some data contained in the EHRs. This way, 
if he finds a match, he is able to discover the corresponding 
patient identity and to decrypt his obfuscated data. However, in 
order to carry out such an attack, the attacker must have access 
to both the PR and the EHRs. In addition, the computation of a 
patient’s secret key can be made harder by exploiting a proof-
of-work scheme [19], such that testing very large numbers of 
keys becomes practically infeasible. 
F. Patient access 
The system provide patients with the chance to access their 
medical records, and optionally to make some choices 
concerning them. In order to allow a patient to access his 
medical data, the system exploits a procedure which is very 
similar to that used for delegating a SMD. 
When a patient wished to access his data, he must subscribe 
to the service through the ALS. Then, the ALS queries the PR 
with the patient identity and finds his corresponding EPID 
encrypted with the PMD secret key. The ALS sends the EPID 
to the patient, who encrypts it again with his secret key before 
sending it back to the ALS. The next time the PMD logs into 
the system, he finds the pending request from his patient. If he 
accepts them, the ALS sends the EEPID to the PMD local 
client, which decrypts it with the PMD secret key. This way, an 
EPID encrypted with the patient secret key is obtained, and it is 
stored in the PR as well, such that the patient can retrieve his 
medical data in the same way as for MDs. An alternative 
approach would be to provide each patient with is PID in clear, 
but it is preferable to avoid the unessential circulation of the 
PID, especially into devices where it could be associated with 
the patient identity (like the patient’s terminals). 
After accessing the system, a patient may have the ability to 
decide which obfuscated medical data are visible to which 
MDs. If the access to an obfuscated data record is disabled for 
one or more MDs assisting a patient, the ALS will prevent 
those MDs from retrieving the obfuscated from the EHRs. 
IV. DATA ENCRYPTION, MANIPULATION AND RETRIEVAL 
As it results from the descriptions provided in the next 
sections, the proposed system requires an intensive use of data 
encryption and manipulation algorithms. 
First of all, the PIDs and some of the medical data must be 
encrypted. For this purpose, our system uses up-to-date 
symmetric encryption schemes, like AES [20]. A special 
feature, which is needed by the symmetric encryption scheme 
adopted by the system, is the chance to revert the decryption 
order. In fact, in order to manage the MD rostering (see Section 
III.C), it is necessary that EPIDSK = DK(EEPIDK,SK), where 
EEPIDK,SK = ESK(EPIDK). Therefore, two successive 
encryptions and decryptions must work independently of the 
order in which the corresponding secret keys are used. This can 
be implemented by using a symmetric cipher (like AES) in 
Output FeedBack (OFB) or Counter (CTR) mode [21]. A 
drawback of these two operating modes is that, if an attacker 
intercepts the plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext (i.e., 
the EPID and the EEPID), he is able to forge encrypted 
messages. However, in the considered system, an attacker 
would not be able to generate a valid EPID to encrypt a second 
time, therefore he is unable to break the system privacy. 
Concerning the security of the databases containing the PR 
and EHRs, in a classical centralized architecture (a few 
databases stored in a few servers) a possible solution consists 
of using the Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) function 
provided by several database engines. This way, even if a copy 
of the whole database is stolen, the data it contains is protected 
from unauthorized accesses. Moving towards a cloud 
architecture, a promising solution consists of exploiting the 
decentralized nature of the storage space and the intrinsic data 
fragmentation to achieve security. In fact, security can be 
obtained by using coding together with all-or-nothing 
transforms and data dispersal [22]. This way, each storage node 
only possesses a small fraction of the whole archive, and 
cannot retrieve any information from it. Furthermore, this 
allows to protect the sensitive data from possible malicious 
cloud service providers or compromised storage nodes. 
Another issue concerns the chance to perform search 
queries on the personal and medical data of the patients. In the 
architecture illustrated in Fig. 1 and described in the previous 
section, if a user has the rights to access the PR or the EHRs, 
he can perform searches on the data stored in clear (i.e., 
without obfuscation). Concerning the obfuscated data, the 
simplest solution is that the authorized user client retrieves 
them, decrypts them and then performs the search in the 
decrypted domain. This solution, however, requires large 
bandwidth and storage space, and may be intolerably slow 
when working on resource-limited devices. Another solution 
can be to build an index for each obfuscated data entry, 
containing a small set of keywords which are then stored in 
clear. This way, the search queries on the obfuscated data are 
accelerated, at the cost of some storage overhead and 
processing power at the time of data entry. A third, pioneer 
solution consists of implementing a searchable encryption 
scheme [23], which allows to perform searches directly in the 
encrypted domain. 
Finally, another important function to be provided by the 
system concerns the computation and extraction of statistical 
data from the PR and EHRs. This is a very important outcome 
of the implementation of a medical information system of the 
type considered. This task can be easily accomplished on the 
non- obfuscated  data, possibly by exploiting the processing 
power provided by the cloud infrastructure, thus avoiding to 
transfer the computational burden to the client terminal. 
Concerning the obfuscated data, a first approach consists again 
of retrieving them locally, decrypting them and performing the 
due computations. This however once again has the drawback 
of requiring large bandwidth, storage space and local 
computing power. Another solution would be to exploit 
homomorphic encryption schemes [24], [25], which allow to 
perform computations in the encrypted domain, and thus to 
outsource computations (e.g., to cloud service providers). 
Although a lot of research work on homomorphic encryption 
schemes is still ongoing, some practical solutions already exist. 
For example, the system proposed in [26] can compute some 
statistical parameters, like means and variances, in the 
encrypted domain. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have described the Nu.Sa. project, together with its 
state of the art and future goals. The aim of the Nu.Sa. project 
is the definition of national level data standards to collect data 
coming from General Practitioners’ Electronic Health Records 
and to allow secure data sharing between them. We have 
presented a software architecture which is able to achieve the 
desired levels of security and privacy of the patients’ data, by 
leveraging suitable cryptographic techniques, while limiting 
complexity and allowing a great level of scalability and 
interoperability. 
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